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PROPERTY AND PRICES TO PROTECT THE 
PLANET 
JONATHAN B. WIENER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In this contribution to the symposium on “Local Property, 
Global Justice: Law and Resources in the Era of Climate Change,” I 
examine a property theory approach to the international legal 
structure of climate change regulation. My analysis proceeds in three 
parts. Part I frames the discussion by describing the tragedy of the 
climate commons and the menu of regulatory instruments available to 
solve this global problem. Part II outlines the choice between the two 
most prominent regulatory instruments on the current menu: prices 
(taxes) versus property (a cap and trade system). Part III argues that 
the difficulty of engaging participation in international regulatory 
schemes means that the cap and trade system is better suited than a 
tax system to solving the problem of global climate change. I conclude 
that a property-based instrument has distinct advantages over a price-
based instrument to protect the global climate commons at the 
international level. 
I. THE TRAGEDY OF THE CLIMATE COMMONS AND 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The planet is suffering a tragedy of the climate commons.1 
Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) pose external harms. 
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 1. For the classic exposition of tragedies of open-access resources, see generally Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), available at http:// 
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/162/3859/1243. For a more detailed application to the 
global climate problem, see generally RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, 
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003) [hereinafter STEWART & 
WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY]. 
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Emissions emanating from anywhere on the planet mix globally in the 
atmosphere and cause global impacts, although those impacts vary 
regionally. The atmosphere is being treated as an open-access 
disposal site for GHGs. Abatement of GHG emissions is costly to the 
actors who undertake abatement, and the benefits of abatement are 
spread globally, so each actor faces an incentive to continue emitting 
– that is, to free ride on others’ abatement efforts. The result is that 
abatement is underprovided compared to the global optimum. 
The fundamental legal question, as in any tragedy of an open-
access resource problem, is how best to restrict access. To solve the 
tragedy of the climate commons, the international community has a 
choice of regulatory instruments for environmental protection.  The 
menu of options available includes regulatory instruments that 
restrict GHG-emitting conduct (such as regulations mandating, or 
forbidding, the use of particular technologies); instruments that 
restrict the quantity of access to the commons to dispose of GHGs 
(such as property rights, performance standards, and cap and trade 
systems); instruments that set the price of access to the commons to 
dispose of GHGs (such as taxes or liability rules that charge a price 
for each use of the resource); instruments that use information 
disclosure on GHG emissions to influence behavior; and instruments 
that attempt to engineer the climate directly.2 
Historically, U.S. domestic environmental law often chose to 
regulate conduct by instructing firms to adopt particular designs or 
technologies to reduce pollution.3 Examples of such conduct 
standards include requirements to install scrubbers to reduce air 
pollution, to install filters to reduce water pollution, or to avoid the 
use of certain types of fish nets. 
More recently, the United States increasingly has used a second 
type of policy tool: quantity or property instruments that solve the 
 
 2. For a more complete taxonomy and analysis of climate policy instruments, see 
generally Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999) [hereinafter Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation]. The 
contributions by my colleagues in this symposium session focus on cap and trade and related 
offset systems. See Annie Petsonk, ‘Docking Stations’: Designing a More Welcoming 
Architecture for a Post-2012 Framework to Combat Climate Change, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 433 (2009) (arguing that docking stations can be a means of increasing the participation of 
major emitting nations in cap-and-trade programs); David Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel 
Governance, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 389 (2009) (arguing that limiting linkage of different 
cap-and-trade markets while increasing efforts to stimulate innovation would better accomplish 
the goals of the cap-and-trade program). 
 3. See Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 705-06. 
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tragedy of an open-access resource by limiting the quantity of access 
to the resource. In principle, this means dividing the resource, 
parceling it, and privatizing it in some way. For land, the U.S. legal 
system typically prevents open-access overuse by spatially dividing 
the resource into limited-access parcels (what we call private 
property). Such spatial parceling does not work very well for 
managing pollutants in the atmosphere or fish in the oceans. For 
mobile resources, the quantity/property instrument to limit access 
takes the form of a use right, not a fixed possessory right. 
A limited use right could be created by a regulatory performance 
standard that limits overuse but (in contrast to conduct instruments) 
allows users “how” flexibility in choosing the methods of compliance 
or abatement. Examples of performance standards are regulations 
that set a maximum allowable amount of pollution or fish caught over 
a period of time. 
Alternatively, such a limited use right might be made 
transferable among users, through a  tradeable allowance, marketable 
permit or transferable quota system—all names for a cap and trade 
system. These instruments limit the quantity of access to the open-
access resource, while providing users both “how” flexibility in 
choosing the methods of compliance and also “where” flexibility in 
choosing the location of abatement across users. If costs of abatement 
vary across methods and across users, then these two types of 
flexibility (“how” and “where”) can improve the cost-effectiveness of 
the regulatory policy. “When” flexibility can also be afforded by 
letting sources shift their abatement effort over time, or by allowing 
banking and borrowing of allowances over time. For climate change, 
with wide variation in the costs of abatement across firms, sectors and 
countries, a cap and trade system could reduce costs very 
substantially compared to fixed performance standards and even 
more compared to central conduct standards.4 
A third type of regulatory instrument relies on prices to limit 
access. A price instrument limits access to the open-access resource 
not by telling actors what to do nor how much they may do, but by 
telling actors the price they must pay to do it. Examples of price 
instruments include taxes on emissions, or subsidies to reduce 
emissions, or liability rules that impose monetary damages on 
emissions as nuisances. 
 
 4. Id. at 716. 
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A fourth type of instrument is information disclosure, which 
force actors to report or reveal their emissions or other risk-related 
behavior. Examples include the Toxics Release Inventory, and 
proposals for a GHG Emissions Inventory. 
A fifth type of instrument seeks not to reduce emissions of 
GHGs, but to manage the heat balance of the planet directly through 
geoengineering projects, such as mirrors put into orbit around the 
earth, or sulfate aerosols injected into the upper atmosphere to try to 
cool the planet. 
The choice of regulatory instruments for environmental 
protection should always be based on a pragmatic evaluation of which 
instruments will yield the best results. In discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of any regulatory instrument, it is always necessary to ask, 
compared to what alternative? 
II.  THE CHOICE BETWEEN TAXES AND TRADING 
In this section, I focus on the choice currently being debated 
between a GHG tax (price instrument) and a GHG cap and trade 
system (quantity/property instrument) as alternative tools to limit 
emissions, especially at the international level. Many (though not all) 
economists favor taxes rather than cap and trade as an instrument to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.5 These economists argue that 
taxes produce at least two major advantages. First, taxes contain 
costs, because setting the tax lets firms know what the price per unit 
of emissions will be. If the true cost of abatement turns out to be 
higher than the tax, firms will pay the tax instead of undertaking the 
abatement, and thereby the tax sets the upper limit on costs. The 
downside is that it is unclear what the emissions result will be. (Some 
say that cap and trade hides the cost while taxes make the cost 
explicit; but one could equally say that taxes hide the emissions result 
 
 5. Economists favoring taxes include, for example, William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not 
to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 26 
(2007) (favoring taxes); Ian. W. H. Parry & William A. Pizer, Emissions Trading Versus CO2 
Taxes Versus Standards, in ASSESSING U.S. CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS: A REPORT 
SUMMARIZING WORK AT RFF AS PART OF THE INTER-INDUSTRY U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 
FORUM 79 (2007) (favoring taxes), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Publications/ 
upload/31809_1.pdf. 
         Economists favoring cap and trade include, for example Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful 
U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) 
(favoring cap and trade); Nathaniel Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable 
Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gases, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 42 (2009) (favoring 
cap and trade). 
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while cap and trade makes the emissions result explicit.)  Many 
economists argue that in the tradeoff between the risk of cost 
escalation (under cap and trade) and the risk of emissions escalation 
(under taxes), it is better to limit costs and to tolerate some emissions 
escalation.6 
Second, some economists often prefer pollution taxes on the 
ground that they raise revenues,7 which can in turn be used to replace 
and reduce other more distortionary taxes on labor and capital – as 
Al Gore says, we should “tax what we burn, not what we earn.”8 
Others see this revenue as a source of funding to invest in clean 
technology projects. 
Neither containing costs nor raising revenues, however, should 
be understood as a fundamental objection to cap and trade. They are 
both important considerations. But cap and trade systems can be 
designed to meet both of these objectives. 
Cap and trade systems can be designed to contain costs in several 
ways. First, the stringency of the cap obviously affects costs. Second, 
given a cap, the design of the trading system can help avoid cost 
escalation. Most directly, the “how” and “where” flexibility in cap 
and trade systems keep costs low by allowing firms to find the least-
cost methods and locations of abatement. Third, a broader and 
thicker market enhances the cost-effectiveness of trading by engaging 
lower-cost abatement opportunities. Extending the cap and trade 
market to include all sectors of the economy, and to include 
international participants,9 will further ensure cost-effectiveness. 
 
 6. See PARRY & PIZER, supra note 5, at 83 (suggesting that a cap and trade program with 
cost-containment mechanisms represents a compromise between cost escalation and emissions 
escalation). This line of argument derives from the classic paper by Martin L. Weitzman, Prices 
vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). 
 7. See Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A 
Reader's Guide, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 157 (1995); Lawrence H. Goulder et al., Revenue-
Raising versus Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of 
Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J. ECON. 708 (1997); Lawrence H. Goulder et al., The 
Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best 
Setting (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6464, 1998); Ian W. H. Parry, 
Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S64, S65, S76 (1995). But 
see Wallace E. Oates, Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the Tax 
System at the Same Time?, 61 S. ECON. J. 915 (1995) (questioning the validity of the double-
dividend argument). 
 8. See John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions Faces a Steep 
Climb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A13 (quoting Al Gore), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/ 07/us/politics/07carbon.html. 
 9. I am referring here to an international system of cap and trade policies, not to a U.S. 
cap and trade policy linked to offset credits purchased in countries without caps. Such uncapped 
WIENER_FINAL.DOC 4/30/2009  2:45:44 PM 
520 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:515 
Fourth, allowing “when” flexibility through multi-year budgets, 
banking, and borrowing can further reduce costs. 
Fifth, a cap and trade system can be modified by adding price 
ceilings and price floors, ensuring that the cap and trade market will 
operate within a constrained range of prices. (These price ceilings and 
floors can be set to rise over time.) A pure price ceiling on a cap and 
trade system is known colloquially as a “safety valve,” because it 
enables sources to purchase unlimited additional allowances at the 
price ceiling, thereby preventing the market price from rising too 
high.10 In effect, the safety valve converts that cap and trade system 
into a tax at the price ceiling; it removes the cap at that price. This is 
attractive to those concerned about cost escalation, but worrisome to 
those concerned about emissions escalation.11 On the other hand, the 
addition of a price floor ensures that the market price for allowances 
will not fall too low, thus ensuring some pressure to reduce emissions.  
Modifying a cap and trade system by applying both a price ceiling and 
a price floor might be an attractive compromise. The combination of 
upper and lower bounds on allowances prices could reduce price 
volatility and associated investment uncertainty, lower the expected 
cost of the cap and trade system, and ensure at least some incentive to 
reduce emissions. This symmetric approach could even lower costs so 
much that it enables policy makers to adopt a more stringent cap at a 
lower cost than an unmodified cap and trade system.12 
An alternative to a price ceiling is to create a limited reserve of 
additional allowances, which could be sold once the market price rises 
to a trigger price. This limited quantity reserve is similar to a safety 
 
offset credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, can 
further reduce costs, but they are less effective at reducing actual emissions because the credits 
come from countries without caps. See STEWART & WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE 
POLICY, supra note 1, at 74, 90-92. 
 10. See, e.g., William A. Pizer, Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global 
Climate Change, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 409, 431 (2002). 
 11. An additional problem with a price ceiling, particularly in the international context, is 
strategic: if multiple countries have safety valve policies that authorize them to sell extra 
allowances, and if these allowances can satisfy obligations in multiple countries, then as emitters 
seek to purchase the lowest-priced extra allowances they can find worldwide, country 
governments will compete to sell allowances at lower prices – that is, to lower their safety valve 
price ceilings, thus further relaxing the constraint on emissions. See STEWART & WIENER,  supra 
note 1, at 90-92. 
 12. See Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer & Danny Kahn, A Symmetric Safety Valve, 
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 09-06, Feb. 2009), available at www.rff.org; Cedric 
Philibert, Price Caps and Price Floors in Climate Policy: A Quantitative Assessment (Int’l 
Energy Agency, Dec. 2008). 
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valve, except that the quantity of the reserve is not unlimited as it 
would be under a pure price ceiling, or it can be seen as a limited 
opportunity to borrow against future allowance allocations for 
current use.13 A limited quantity reserve would pose less risk of 
emissions escalation than a pure price ceiling. 
Furthermore, cap and trade systems can be designed to raise 
revenues by selling or auctioning the allowances. Cap and trade is a 
quantity instrument (limiting emissions) that derives from a property 
approach (parceling temporary use rights) to solving the tragedy of 
the climate commons. These use rights can be given away by the 
government to historical users (called “grandfathering”), but they can 
also be sold to users. In a sale or auction of GHG emissions 
allowances, the state earns the revenues from the allocation of use 
rights in the public commons, rather than awarding the scarcity value 
of those use rights to private emitters for free.14 The Obama 
administration’s first budget, introduced in February 2009, projects 
significant revenues from auctioning GHG allowances.15 Under an 
international cap and trade system, presumably the choice of whether 
to auction or otherwise distribute allowances would be left to each 
country to decide. 
Thus, cost containment and revenue generation are not 
fundamental differences between a tax and a cap and trade system.  
But there is a key difference, as I discuss in the next section. 
III. PRICES, PROPERTY, AND PARTICIPATION 
The deeper distinction between taxes (price instruments) and cap 
and trade (quantity/property instruments) lies in their different 
abilities to engage effective participation. At the international level, 
there is no global sovereign to select a policy and compel 
 
 13. See Brian C. Murray, Richard G. Newell & William A. Pizer, Balancing Cost and 
Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve for Cap-and-Trade (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14258), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14258. The 
allowance reserve could operate automatically when the market price rises to the trigger price, 
or the allowance reserve could be managed by a “Carbon Fed” board with the power to 
authorize additional allowance sales or greater use of offset credits. Id. at 20. 
 14. See Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 281-82 (2001). 
 15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA 
OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 21 (2009), available at http:// www.white 
house.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf ("Through a 100 
percent auction to ensure that the biggest polluters do not enjoy windfall profits, this program 
will fund vital investments in a clean energy future totaling $150 billion over 10 years, starting in 
FY 2012."). 
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compliance.16 We must act, if at all, with current institutions. A basic 
principle of international law is that treaties bind countries only by 
their consent. Thus, an effective climate treaty must engage countries’ 
participation – and engaging participation is powerfully influenced by 
the choice of the regulatory instrument. 
A. Global Emissions 
Central to the choice of regulatory instrument and the challenge 
of attracting participation is the fact that greenhouse gases mix 
globally in the atmosphere – a crucial reason that GHG emissions 
pose a tragedy of the climate commons. Because GHG emissions 
from anywhere on the planet affect the planet globally, any effective 
regulatory framework will require participation by multiple countries 
to produce the global public good of climate protection. Emissions 
from major developing countries, unconstrained under the Kyoto 
Protocol, have been rising rapidly.17 
Moreover, partial action, in the form of a regulatory regime that 
covers only some emitting countries, is vulnerable to the problem of 
“leakage”: cross-national movement of emissions-intensive 
activities.18 Leakage could occur through relocation of specific 
facilities, or through changing relative prices in the world economy 
which induce shifts in emissions-intensive activities. Economic studies 
of how the world economy would respond to partial regulation 
suggest that leakage could be quite significant. For example, the MIT 
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, which has 
developed a very extensive integrated assessment model, has found 
that leakage rates could be very high, even exceeding 100%, 
depending on the stringency of the cap or tax and depending on 
which countries are covered.19 
Leakage exceeding 100% means that partial regulation by some 
countries (such as the US and Europe) would actually contribute to 
 
 16. Some highly concerned about climate change might seek to establish a coercive world 
government, but even if that could be done (with all its drastic disadvantages), it would likely 
take too long to be relevant to solving the climate problem. 
 17. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA 
L. REV.1805, 1807-10 (2008); INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2008 (2008). 
 18. See STEWART & WIENER,  supra note 1, at 39, 88. 
 19. See Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon 
Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 441 (2005) (“[T]he global carbon leakage rate is found to range 
. . . [as high as] 130%, in which case a policy to limit carbon emissions in the OECD has the 
perverse effect of increasing global emissions.”). 
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more GHG emissions, not less, by shifting emitting activities to other 
countries.  To see how this could happen, it is useful to look at the 
micro level. There is anecdotal evidence that leakage already is 
occurring from Europe (seeking to restrict its GHG emissions) to 
China (where GHG emissions have been growing rapidly). A 
December 2007 front page story in the New York Times attributed a 
reduction in Germany’s emissions, restricted under European 
policies, to leakage.20 According to the article, German steel factories 
were dismantled, shipped to China, and rebuilt there, where steel 
manufacturing emits three times more carbon dioxide per ton of steel 
because of a different fuel mix and inefficiencies in production.21 
Leakage also imposes political costs. Leakage renders receiving 
countries like China more GHG-intensive and thus more reluctant to 
restrict emissions.  At the same time, the fear of leakage inhibits 
countries like the United States from adopting restrictions on their 
own greenhouse gas emissions. Such political costs explain, for 
example, why the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 not to ratify a treaty like the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997 for fear of leakage of industry and jobs.22 
B. Participation 
Thus, the pivotal criterion for achieving an effective international 
regulatory regime for climate change is whether the international 
community can accomplish sufficiently broad participation. 
Participation need not include every single country in the world, but 
the great majority of current and future major emitting countries 
must participate in the regime for it to be effective. Such participation 
might require as few as the top twenty or thirty emitting countries. 
This still poses the significant challenge in a post-Kyoto treaty 
(currently being negotiated) of adding the major developing countries 
(including China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, 
Korea, and others), as well as the United States, to the set of 
 
 20. See Joseph Kahn & Mark Landler, China Grabs West’s Smoke-Spewing Factories, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he same hulking blast furnace, dismantled and shipped piece 
by piece from Germany’s old industrial heartland to Hebei Province, China’s new Ruhr Valley. 
The transfer, one of dozens since the late 1990s, contributed to a burst in China’s steel 
production, which now exceeds that of Germany, Japan and the United States combined. It left 
Germany with lost jobs and a bad case of postindustrial angst. . . . China’s less efficient steel 
mills, and its greater reliance on coal, meant that it emitted three times as much carbon dioxide 
per ton of steel as German steel producers.” (emphasis added)). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). After this vote, the Clinton-
Gore administration never submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. 
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countries that were obliged to limit their emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol (including Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, and Russia) 
The consent voting rule in international treaties is quite different 
from the voting rule we have for the adoption of most environmental 
regulation, most property rule systems, and most legal systems. 
Consider the spectrum of voting rules running from unitary fiat at one 
end, where one autocratic ruler can choose the regulatory policy; 
through majority rule in the middle, where 50% plus one of a polity 
can choose a regulatory rule; to consent and even unanimity at the 
other end of the spectrum.23 Along that spectrum, more and more 
votes are required to adopt a policy. Recruiting these votes requires 
showing that it is in the interest of each actor to endorse or join the 
proposal. 
Thus, for example, obtaining a majority coalition requires 
persuading members of Congress that they should vote in favor of a 
particular regulatory policy. Obtaining consent to a treaty requires 
persuading governments of each country to adopt that treaty. Such 
voting requirements have a fundamental implication for the design 
and the choice of regulatory instruments at the international level, as 
well as at the national level.24 The comparison of taxes to cap and 
trade typically assumes a voting rule of unitary fiat - what James 
Buchanan has called a supposed benevolent despot who will choose 
the normatively efficient instrument.25 Such analysis recommends the 
instrument that maximizes aggregate net benefits to society. In the 
international law arena, however, no unitary fiat actor exists. There is 
no global sovereign. As a result, the solution has to engage 
cooperation and participation by countries, and it must do so on 
terms that governments find attractive - otherwise they will decline to 
join. 
As with any international policy problem, there are ways of using 
sticks and ways of using carrots to achieve the policy goal. Here I will 
not dwell at length on sticks; military coercion to reduce GHG 
emissions is unlikely, and trade sanctions tend to be ineffective 
 
 23. For a more detailed discussion, see Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra 
note 2. 
 24. See id.; STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1. 
 25. See James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 
243, 243 (1987) ("Economists should cease proffering policy advice as if they were employed by 
a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which political decisions are 
made. . . . [We should] postulate some model of the state, of politics, before proceeding to 
analyze the effects of alternative policy measures."). 
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because they are often not credible (given the harms they inflict on 
the imposing country’s own consumers) and because target countries 
often rally to resist and deflect them. And if trade sanctions were 
effective, they might undermine rather than enhance the target 
country’s economic capacity to remake its economy on a low-GHG 
emissions path. 
In the absence of effective sticks, the key issue is carrots, 
including the direct benefits of climate protection, and side payments 
provided by the international regime. The question is thus not just 
which regulatory instrument to choose, but how to pair the necessary 
inducements that attract countries to participate with the regulatory 
instrument. On this question, property (cap and trade) and prices 
(taxes) perform quite differently. 
Attracting China to participate in a GHG emissions limitation 
regime will not be easy. A main concern has been that China would 
not participate in a climate change treaty on the grounds that China’s 
leaders thought the costs to China would be high and the benefits to 
China would be low or negative.26 Yet there are indications that 
China’s stance on the issue is now changing. China’s leaders are 
seeing greater incentives to join a serious effort that limits its own 
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as those of other countries, for 
several reasons: first, the impacts of climate change in China are now 
looking more serious than earlier anticipated; second, the co-benefits 
in public health protection of limiting emissions from fossil fuel 
production are growing; third, the Chinese government may be 
concerned about political instability arising from extreme weather 
events associated with climate change, against the backdrop of a 
history of dynastic change in China triggered by past climate changes 
and a public philosophy connecting natural disasters to regime 
change; and fourth, the strong interest of the Chinese government 
and people in prosperity can be promoted through the design of the 
international climate regime itself.27 
The last point is crucial: the international regime must offer 
attractive reasons to China, and other major developing countries, to 
join and to implement effective policies. Otherwise their emissions 
will grow unabated and may accelerate due to leakage. Attracting 
 
 26. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United 
States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas 
Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1682 (2008). 
 27. These reasons are developed more fully in Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy 
Change in China, supra note 16. 
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their participation means offering a combination of benefits – in 
climate protection, reduction in co-pollutants, economic gains, 
national reputation, fairness, and side payments (as well as other 
benefits) – that justify the costs and make joining in the perceived 
national interest of each country. 
At the international level, taxes are unlikely to attract 
participation. Taxes impose costs not only on emissions, but also on 
infra-marginal emissions – that is, they not only discourage emissions, 
but they also require parties to pay for their remaining unabated 
emissions. If a country views the benefits of joining a climate treaty as 
small or even negative, then it is unlikely to adopt a tax on its own 
emissions, and even less likely to allow an international body to 
impose that tax on (and keep the revenues from taxing) the country’s 
emissions. 
To attract participation, a tax could be combined with some kind 
of side payment to repay the costs of the tax, such as direct 
government-to-government foreign aid. Foreign aid, however, is often 
an inefficient way to deliver resources. It is often distorted by 
corruption, and often undermines indigenous industry. If coupled 
with a tax on GHG emissions, foreign aid to repay the cost of that tax 
would undermine the incentive effect of the tax in reducing emissions. 
The essential feature of price instruments – that they restrict access to 
the commons by setting the price but not constraining the quantity of 
resource use – means that coupling taxes with side payments of cash 
will tend to offset the price instrument’s effectiveness in reducing 
emissions. Indeed, pure payments to abate emissions can even turn 
out to increase net emissions by attracting more investment to the 
subsidized industry.28 
This logic means that taxes combined with cash aid will be less 
effective at controlling emissions than pure taxes or than 
quantity/property instruments that cap emissions. This is not 
surprising, as the key point of the economics literature comparing 
taxes and trading, discussed above, was that taxes limit costs while 
 
 28. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 211-28 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1975) (noting that abatement subsidies 
would reduce emissions at each firm but increase the size of the polluting industry and 
observing that using subsidies could conceivably increase net emissions); Wallace E. Oates, 
Economics, Economists, and Environmental Policy, 16 E. ECON. J. 289, 290 (1990) ("[I]n a 
competitive setting, [abatement] subsidies will lead to an excessively large number of firms and 
industry output. . . . [I]t is even conceivable that aggregate industry emissions could go up!" 
(citations omitted)); Robert E. Kohn, When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total 
Emissions, 59 S. ECON. J. 77, 84-85 (1992). 
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letting emissions vary, whereas cap and trade limits emissions while 
letting costs vary. The pivotal new dimension at the international 
level, not addressed by that literature, is that a tax or cap and trade 
system cannot simply be imposed on emitters; countries must consent 
to be bound by a treaty, so they will often require side payments to 
attract their participation. The side payments, like subsidies to abate, 
introduce their own inefficiency. Combining side payments with taxes 
is less effective at limiting GHG emissions than using a cap and trade 
system to allocate side payments. 
A better system to limit GHG emissions at the international level 
is a cap and trade system in which the allowance allocation delivers 
the side payment that attracts countries to join. Giving major 
developing countries “headroom” allowances amounting to some 
future growth in emissions would confer on them some of the scarcity 
rents in the new market for limited emissions use rights, which they 
could sell in the trading market to higher-cost abaters (firms in 
industrialized countries) at a profit. The developing countries would 
thereby reap the side payment attracting their participation, while still 
acceding to a quantity limit on emissions which prevents the perverse 
effect of side payments on aggregate emissions. China, for example, 
could be a net loser under a system of national caps or national taxes, 
but a net gainer under a system of cap and trade with allowance 
allocations that embody this principle. Thus, a quantity/property-
based cap and trade system can more effectively (or less inefficiently) 
combine emissions limits with side payments to attract participation 
than can a tax or pure subsidy approach.29 
Empirically, the quantity/property approach to engaging 
participation appears to have proven more successful than the price 
approach. During the 1990s the European Union tried to adopt an 
EU carbon tax, and failed in large part because it could not secure 
consent among its member states to adopt the same tax in poorer and 
richer countries alike. After a decade of pursuing this carbon tax 
unsuccessfully while denouncing cap and trade, the EU changed its 
position on instrument choice during 1998-2001 and successfully 
adopted the EU Emissions Trading System, using its “burden-sharing 
agreement” (in effect, an allocation of allowances) to attract 
 
 29. For more detailed discussion, see Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra 
note 2. 
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participation by member states.30 Similarly, the US used the allocation 
of allowances in its 1990 Acid Rain Trading Program to build the 
majority coalition for passage in the Congress, and the Kyoto 
Protocol used the allocation of allowances to engage participation by 
Russia and Ukraine.31 
The implications for global justice are direct. A cap and trade 
system would deliver both future climate protection benefits to 
vulnerable countries (which are often poor countries), and also side 
payments in the form of headroom allowances that will support their 
development goals, local industry, and prosperity in the near term 
through trade in a new global marketplace of investment in cleaner 
technology and land use conservation. It would do so through cost-
effective transactions by competitive private market actors. By 
contrast, an international GHG tax system either will impose costs on 
developing countries (leading to their choice not to participate), or 
will be combined with side payments that undermine the climate 
protection effectiveness of the tax and that are delivered through 
government foreign aid. Government foreign aid, generally speaking, 
is less cost-effective than market trade, is often distorted by 
corruption, often undermines local industry, and can yield perverse 
increases in emissions. International cap and trade thus promises to 
be more cost-effective, less bureaucratic, more supportive of poverty 
alleviation, and more fair than an international tax system. 
A caveat: The “clean development mechanism” (CDM) under 
the Kyoto Protocol, or other systems for purchasing GHG emission 
offsets via project-specific investments in abatement in countries 
without caps are not truly cap and trade systems and lack its key 
advantages. The CDM and similar offset programs are trading 
without caps. They may have helped somewhat in beginning the flow 
of financing to developing countries to help bend downward the 
trajectory of their future emissions. But their impact has been modest.  
And a formal cap and trade system could have both reduced 
emissions more and delivered greater economic and environmental 
 
 30. See FRANK CONVERY, DENNY ELLERMAN, & CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS, THE 
EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD: 
INTERIM REPORT 7-8 (2008), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/ECM_Interim 
Rpt_March08.pdf. 
 31. See Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 754-55, 781-82. When 
the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the expected value of Russia’s ability to sell 
its headroom allowances was undercut; this was one reason why Russia then hesitated for four 
years before joining the Kyoto Protocol, and bargained for additional inducements from the 
European Union. 
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benefits to developing countries. Payments for GHG emissions 
offsets in countries or sectors without caps – as occurs under the 
CDM – is vulnerable to within-country leakage, and could even 
increase aggregate emissions if emissions at the CDM project are 
reduced but aggregate emissions increase elsewhere in the recipient 
country and as investment is attracted to the subsidized sector. In 
addition, uncapped offset systems may also discourage countries from 
joining a formal cap and trade system. If the country can sell 
uncapped credits at a price that is almost as high as the price at which 
formal cap and trade allowances would sell, then there is less reason 
to accept the cap.32 In a post-Kyoto treaty and in new US legislation, 
the CDM and offset programs should be folded into a formal 
international economy-wide cap and trade system. 
C. Implementation 
A further issue deserves attention: implementation after 
adoption. Countries might agree to a treaty, but do little to carry out 
its terms. Here again, the choice of regulatory instrument matters. 
Lower cost should make both adoption and implementation easier, so 
both taxes and cap and trade should be more successful than higher-
cost instruments such as central conduct standards. 
One concern might be that implementing and enforcing a cap 
and trade system would require a bureaucracy or institutional 
capacity that developing countries lack. But that concern applies to 
all instruments. It is true that a cap and trade system requires a 
monitoring and enforcement system to measure emissions, track 
allowances as they are acquired and traded, and impose sanctions on 
sources whose emissions exceed their allowance holdings in each 
period. Likewise, though, a tax requires a monitoring and 
enforcement system to measure emissions, calculate and levy taxes, 
check for cheating, and punish tax evaders. The extent of bureaucracy 
and institutional capacity needed to implement a cap and trade 
program seems no greater than, and could be considerably less than, 
that needed to implement a tax. Just think of the enormous 
enforcement machinery and time and expense of collecting taxes in 
the US. 
There are two reasons to think that cap and trade, at least at the 
international level, is likely to enjoy more successful implementation 
and enforcement than taxes. The first reason involves what I have 
 
 32. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1, at 74, 90-92. 
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called “fiscal cushioning.”33 Through myriad changes to their other 
policies (taxes, subsidies, tariffs, and the like), countries are likely to 
seek to cushion the burden on their domestic economies of emissions 
taxes or cap and trade limits. Under a GHG tax, such cushioning 
strategies will affect the level of emissions. A country could be in full 
nominal compliance with an agreed GHG tax, but, through 
cushioning tactics, it could minimize the actual effect of the tax on the 
domestic economy and thus could vitiate the effect of the tax on 
actual emissions. By contrast, under a cap and trade system, a country 
could use cushion tactics to shield its economy, but the quantity cap 
would still limit its actual emissions. (Instead, other distortions would 
be generated in its economy.) 
The problem of fiscal cushioning can be seen as a principal-agent 
monitoring problem. The treaty regime will have more difficulty 
monitoring the actual efficacy of national GHG taxes, and less 
difficulty monitoring the actual efficacy of GHG caps. Amidst the 
numerous fiscal cushioning tactics being undertaken, it would be 
quite difficult for outside observers (the treaty regime) to monitor a 
country’s actual implementation and forecast the true effect of a tax 
on GHG emissions, muddied as it would be by the fiscal cushioning 
tactics, and with no limit on emissions.34 But it would still be 
straightforward for outside observers to monitor the actual 
implementation and true effect of a cap and trade system on GHG 
emissions, just by monitoring aggregate emissions compared to the 
cap. This difference derives from the basic difference between price 
instruments such as taxes and quantity/property instruments such as 
trading: the former work by setting the price but do not directly limit 
emissions, whereas the latter limit emissions and let the price vary in 
the market. And this difference derives from the reality of national 
sovereignty confronting regulatory regimes at the international level, 
where there is no centralized benevolent policy maker to choose the 
optimal instrument regulating firms, but only national governments 
adopting and implementing (or not) an agreed framework. Fiscal 
cushioning interferes directly with the effect of price instruments on 
the quantity of emissions, but not with the effect of quantity 
 
 33. See Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 785-88. 
 34. See JOSEPH ALDY, EDUARDO LEY & IAN PARRY, A TAX-BASED APPROACH TO 
SLOWING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 26-28 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 
08-26, 2008) (recognizing the problem of fiscal cushioning, and proposing complex monitoring 
regimes to try to salvage an international GHG tax from fiscal cushioning), available at 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-26.pdf . 
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instruments on the quantity of emissions. In the presence of fiscal 
cushioning tactics in an international system, nominal compliance is 
not the same as true effectiveness, and real reductions in emissions 
are easier to monitor and enforce under quantity/property 
instruments than under price instruments. 
The second difference in implementation relates to the political 
economy of regulation. Under a tax, every taxpayer has an incentive 
to lobby to relax or remove the tax. And the tax authority, seeking 
revenues, has an incentive to keep the taxed activity going strong and 
generating tax revenues, thus setting a revenue-maximizing tax that is 
lower (less stringent) than the optimal externality-controlling tax.35 
These forces combine to yield pollution taxes that are suboptimally 
low. Under cap and trade, by contrast, allowance holders quickly 
constitute a lobby in favor of keeping the allowances scarce – that is, 
in favor of enforcement of the cap – because lax enforcement means 
that their allowances lose value.36 This helps overcome the concern 
about an enforcement deficit. More generally, it raises the question of 
revising the cap (or tax) over time. The climate change treaty regime 
and national legislation should build in mechanisms for adaptive 
management – for periodic review of the stringency of the cap and 
whether it should be tightened or loosened in light of new 
information.37 
CONCLUSION 
At the international level, given the structure of international 
law, a quantity/property-based cap and trade system has distinct 
 
 35. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 284 (1982) (suggesting that 
tax authorities may administer pollution taxes "with more of an eye toward increasing 
government revenues than protecting the environment"); Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, 
Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL 
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 437 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 
1985) (finding that in practice, most pollution tax systems have been adopted to raise revenue 
rather than to deter pollution); Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1998) (observing 
the political forces contributing to this result); see generally MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSON, 
GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES (1994) (finding that pollution taxes in Europe have been low). 
 36. This political pressure can also help keep the total number of allowances from being 
raised. It may be too strict. An example is taxicab medallions in New York City: the city 
allocated just fewer than 12,000 taxi medallions in 1937, and, under pressure from medallion 
owners, forestalled the issuance of any additional medallions until 60 years later, when the city 
added just 400 in 1996. A Revolution! New York's Cabs, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1996, at 21. 
 37. Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in 
Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 234-35 (2008). 
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advantages over other instruments such as a tax: better incentives to 
engage participation and implementation, and better prospects to 
deliver both efficiency and justice. These are the crucial criteria for 
successful international response to the tragedy of the climate 
commons. 
A tax may have advantages in cost containment under 
uncertainty. But a cap and trade system can contain costs through 
“how,” “where,” and “when” flexibility, through broad market scope, 
and perhaps (though this deserves further study, especially at the 
international level) through carefully designed modifications such as a 
combined price ceiling and price floor (set to rise over time). A tax 
can raise revenues, but so can allowance auctions. 
Two decades ago, in 1990, Richard Stewart and I proposed a 
comprehensive international cap and trade system for climate change 
protection.38 At that time, some in the Bush (father) administration 
disliked the cap idea, even though they were advocating cap and trade 
for acid rain control in the domestic Clean Air Act. Meanwhile, the 
EU and some environmental groups disliked the trading idea, even 
though the Environmental Defense Fund was a leading architect of 
cap and trade systems. The cap and trade idea was informally 
included in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(dubbed “joint implementation”), and then more formally authorized 
in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol’s article 17 (as well as the uncapped 
offsets market of its CDM), but still faced strong opposition in 
Europe and elsewhere. Meanwhile the Berlin Mandate in 1995 
exempted developing countries from emissions limits, thereby leaving 
their growing emissions unconstrained and also leaving them out of a 
cap and trade system from which the developing countries could have 
earned net gains. After 2000, the cap and trade idea was adopted in 
the EU ETS, and in the Lieberman-McCain bills and subsequent 
proposals in the US Congress. Some developing countries expressed 
interest in joining such a system.39 
As we negotiate the post-Kyoto treaty regime toward the 
Copenhagen meeting in December 2009, the prospects for 
international cap and trade are looking brighter. The pivotal 
advantage of a quantity/property-based cap and trade system in 
 
 38. For the history, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: 
Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295 
(2001). 
 39. See Petsonk, supra note 2. 
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engaging international participation is now coming to be widely 
recognized. As Al Gore put it recently, “For more than 20 years, I 
have supported a CO2 tax offset by an equal reduction in taxes 
elsewhere . . . However, a cap-and-trade system is also essential and 
actually offers a better prospect for a global agreement, in part 
because it is difficult to imagine a harmonized global CO2 tax.”
40 
There is reason to be optimistic, given the history of the shift 
from central conduct standards towards cap and trade systems, such 
as the cap and trade systems adopted in the United States for acid 
rain and in Europe for GHGs. Europe’s switch, from favoring taxes 
and denouncing cap and trade during the entire decade of the 1990s, 
to adopting the European Emissions Trading System, is particularly 
significant. (The ETS had some problems in its pilot phase, but it is 
being improved in its first full phase.) The new Obama administration 
has firmly backed a cap and trade approach. 
In the larger context, global climate change is one of the major 
global issues on which the United States and China will need to 
construct a global geopolitical partnership over the coming decades. 
This is an opportunity for global strategy on a scale of centuries. 
China in a longer historical sense is returning to its former status as a 
great power; China represented about a third of world economic 
output before the European industrial revolution.41 If the Chinese 
leadership takes a very long run perspective on its role in the world, 
and views the peaceful rise of China and its harmonious society as a 
very long term project, then the United States will need to engage 
China’s participation to protect the global climate in that same long-
term context. It will need to show how a cost-effective approach to 
climate protection can benefit China’s long-term development. That 
is a project in which a creative American administration can take the 
lead to work together with China, Europe and others to construct a 
new world order that is successful for planetary protection as well as 
for world prosperity, alleviating poverty, freedom, and other crucial 
issues. It would mean constructing a new property regime to conserve 
the global commons. 
 
 40. Broder, supra, note 8, at A13. 
 41. See ANGUS MADDISON, CONTOURS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1-2030AD (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2007). Graphs depicting Maddison's data are posted on Greg Mankiw's Blog at 
http://gregmankiw.blo gspot.com/2006/09/milken-on-world-economy.html (covering 1820-2001), 
and on Catherine Mulbrandon, Visualizing Economics, at http://www.visualizingeconomics.com/ 
2008/01/20/ share-of-world-gdp/ (covering 1500-2000). 
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After centuries of the evolution of property law into its modern 
multifaceted elements, and several decades of designing regulatory 
instruments, including two decades of analyzing and advocating a 
quantity/property cap and trade instrument for climate protection, we 
have learned a great deal. Can we now protect the planet with a 
comprehensive cap and trade system? Yes we can. 
 
